

# Leverage OSINT to Trace APT Group

Bowen Pan  
360 Enterprise Security Group

# About us.

## 360 Threat Intelligence Center

- A team of 360 Enterprise Security Group
- Focus on threat intelligence and advanced targeted attacks tracing.
- APT threat monitoring and tracing, uncovered several APT Groups.






# About us.

360 Threat Intelligence Center @360TIC · 9月21日  
Full disclosure of #PoisonVine(#APT-C-01) #APT group .  
[mp.weixin.qq.com/s/-H02Bm08qbOW...](http://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/-H02Bm08qbOW...)

360 Threat Intelligence Center @360TIC · 9月12日  
Possible #OceanLotus #APT group recent targeted attack cases by exploiting #CVE-2017-11882 and #EternalBlue.  
[ti.360.net/blog/articles/...](http://ti.360.net/blog/articles/...)  
翻译推文  
34 45


360 Threat Intelligence Center @360TIC · 7月6日  
Disclosure of a new #APT group #BlueMushroom (APT-C-12) and its recent campaign Operation NuclearCrisis, report here [ti.360.net/uploads/2018/0...](http://ti.360.net/uploads/2018/0...)  
翻译推文

360 Threat Intelligence Center @360TIC · 7月26日  
Details of APT-C-35 (Donot Team, Arbor's name) #APT group and its latest activities [ti.360.net/blog/articles/...](http://ti.360.net/blog/articles/...)  
翻译推文



# Motivation

- **Why we need OSINT?**
- Tracing of APT Groups is just like a jigsaw game.
- We need more comprehensive threat intelligence about APT Groups.
- External intelligence will be helpful.



<http://sc.chinaz.com/tupiah/160415232963.htm>




# Motivation

Thanks to the collections of APT reports by researchers.

- <https://github.com/aptnotes/data>
- [https://github.com/CyberMonitor/APT\\_CyberCriminal\\_Campagin\\_Collections](https://github.com/CyberMonitor/APT_CyberCriminal_Campagin_Collections)


- ❑ Update is not timely.
- ❑ Report is unstructured, cannot use it directly.
- ❑ Report is not INTELLIGENCE.



statistic of between 2010 to 2018.5

# Motivation

Our collections of APT reports from Security Vendors in 2018 1H, average 1-1.6 article per day.






# Motivation

Nearly 100+ APT actors are reported publicly, and dozens of them still conduct threat activities frequently nowadays.

- Construction of APT actors TTP & Profiles.
- Leverage OSINT to trace them.




# Methodology



Threat Intelligence Lifecycle




# Methodology



# Methodology - Collect

Sources of OSINT related to APT:

- Security vendors: websites, vendor research blog.
- Security media and news.
- Social media: Twitter, Blogger.
- Public threat feed.





# Methodology - Collect

Besides using spiders, researchers can choose RSS or similar tools.

## RSS Tool

The screenshot shows an RSS tool interface. On the left, there is a sidebar with a list of sources including '安全客-有思想的安...', 'APT - Security Affairs', 'Arbor Networks Thr...', 'Blog - Flashpoint', 'Cisco's Talos Intellig...', 'FreeBuf互联网安全...', 'Malwarebytes Labs', 'McAfee Blogs', 'McAfee Labs - McA...', 'Palo Alto Networks ...', 'Recorded Future', 'Securelist - Kaspers...', 'Symantec Blogs', 'The Akamai Blog', and 'The Citizen Lab'. The main content area displays an article titled 'Hacking Team卷土重来? CVE-2018-5002 Flash 0day漏洞APT攻击分析与关联' (Hacking Team returns? CVE-2018-5002 Flash 0day vulnerability APT attack analysis and correlation). The article text mentions that 360 Enterprise Security Threat Intelligence Center recently captured an APT attack case using the CVE-2018-5002 Flash 0day vulnerability. Below the article is a 'VISIT WEBSITE' button.

## Google Alerts

The screenshot shows a Google Alerts configuration page for the search term 'OceanLotus APT'. The settings are as follows: 'How often' is set to 'At most once a day', 'Sources' is 'Automatic', 'Language' is 'English', 'Region' is 'Any Region', and 'How many' is 'Only the best results'. There is an 'Enter email' field, a 'Create Alert' button, and a 'Hide options' link. Below the configuration, a list of search results is shown, including: 'OceanLotus by SkyEye Labs in 2015.', 'Cyber Espionage is Alive and Well: APT32 and the Threat to Global Corporations', 'Operation Cobalt Kitty', 'Web Crawling Data Brings OceanLotus Infrastructure to the Surface', and 'Ocean Lotus Group/APT 32 identified as Vietnamese APT group'.

# Methodology - Classify

## Classify filtered OSINT data



- Threat activities, incidents
  - Malspam, targeted attack, cybercrime, APT
- Threat analysis
  - Ransomware, malicious miner, exploit kit, bankbot, etc.
  - Vulnerability or exploitation.

Reports from security vendors are more valuable, because they include more technical details and even indicators, which benefit further threat hunting.

# Methodology - Structure

Retrieve information from OSINT data and summarize it.

Based on the STIX, we can easily to describe it and make it simpler.



 Threat Actor
alias name
intent
state region
language
target
TTPs
...



# Methodology - Structure

APT REPORTS

## Operation Daybreak

Flash zero-day exploit deployed by the ScarCruft APT Group

By Costin Raiu, Anton Ivanov on June 17, 2016. 6:00 am

CONTENTS »

Earlier this year, we deployed new technologies in Kaspersky Lab products to identify and block zero-day attacks. This technology already proved its effectiveness earlier this year, when it caught an Adobe Flash zero day exploit (CVE-2016-1010). Earlier this month, our technology caught another zero-day Adobe Flash Player exploit deployed in targeted attacks. We believe the attacks are launched by an APT Group we track under the codename "ScarCruft".

ScarCruft is a relatively new APT group; victims have been observed in Russia, Nepal, South Korea, China, India, Kuwait and Romania. The group has several ongoing operations, utilizing multiple exploits — two for Adobe Flash and one for Microsoft Internet Explorer.

Operation Daybreak appears to have been launched by ScarCruft in March 2016 and employs a previously unknown (0-day) Adobe Flash Player exploit. It is also possible that the group deployed another zero day exploit, CVE-2016-0147, which was patched in April.



Campaign

**Campaign**

time range

target

TTP

...




# Methodology - Structure



Blog Home > Unit 42 > Sofacy Uses DealersChoice to Target European Government Agency

## Sofacy Uses DealersChoice to Target European Government Agency

By Robert Falcone  
 March 15, 2018 at 1:00 PM  
 Category: Unit 42 Tags: DealersChoice, European Government Agency, Sofacy  
 14,816 views



## Indicators of compromise:

### Malicious IPs and hostnames:

- 212.7.217.110
- reg.flnet[.]org
- webconncheck.myfw[.]us

### MD5s:

```
3e5ac6bbf108fec97e1cc36560ab0b6
a6f14b547d9a7190a1f9f1c06f906063
e51ce28c2e2d226365bc5315d3e5f83e
067681b79756156ba26c12bc36bf835c
f8a2d4ddf9dc2de750c8b4b7ee45ba3f
8844a537e7f533192ca8e81886e70fbc
```



# Methodology - Structure

objects & relations



alias name

state region, languages, TTPs

海莲花	<p>OceanLotus</p> <p>APT32</p> <p>Cobalt Kitty</p> <p>APT-C-00</p> <p>SeaLotus</p>	<p>海莲花组织是由360最早披露的一个APT组织，其自2012年4月起，该组织针对中国政府、科研院所、海事机构、海域建设、航运企业等相关重要领域展开了有组织、有计划、有针对性的长时间不间断攻击。</p> <p>2014年2月以后，OceanLotus进入攻击活跃期，并于2014年5月发动了最大规模的一轮鱼叉攻击，大量受害者因打开带毒的邮件附件而感染特种木马。</p> <p>至17年该组织的攻击依然存在。</p> <p>FireEye后续也称其为APT32，其针对多个行业的私营企业、外国政府、持不同政见者和记者实施攻击，其还广泛使用失陷的网站来攻击受害者。其拥有一套功能完备的恶意代码，并结合商业工具实施攻击。</p> <p>参考：</p> <p><a href="https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html">https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html</a></p> <p><a href="https://www.volatility.com/blog/2017/11/06/oceanlotus-blossoms-mass-digital-surveillance-and-exploitation-of-asean-nations-the-media-human-rights-and-civil-society/">https://www.volatility.com/blog/2017/11/06/oceanlotus-blossoms-mass-digital-surveillance-and-exploitation-of-asean-nations-the-media-human-rights-and-civil-society/</a></p>	<p>中</p> <p>2012</p> <p>2018</p> <p>该组织拥有非常高的社会工程学技巧，并且常用鱼叉攻击和水坑攻击，并且会利用和修改公开的攻击工具和开源项目。常用PowerShell脚本、COM scriptlets，恶意代码使用C++编写，也有C#编写的恶意代码。</p> <p>战术：</p> <p>1. 邮件鱼叉攻击，附带包括伪装成文档的PE文件、HTA文件、</p>
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
# Methodology - Analysis

We need to do further analysis:

- Check the OSINT is accurate or not.
  - Reported threat actor is really THE ACTOR?
  - Uncovered a new actor or overlapped with the old ones?
- Check the IOCs, sometimes we found these happens in the report:
  - Hash string lost 1 byte
  - subdomain of legal website mixed in the C&C domain list, may cause false positive
- Update the actor's TTP & profile.
- Found the relations & overlapping based on the OSINT and internal threat data

# Methodology - Analysis

Diamond Model in the attack lifecycle.




# Example - OceanLotus

Decoy document tagged OceanLotus(aka APT32) from Twitter



exploit document




malicious macro


Shellcode load an dll has same export name

## 海莲花APT团伙利用CVE-2017-8570漏洞的新样本及关联分析

2018-04-17 By 360威胁情报中心 | 事件追踪



<https://ti.360.net/blog/articles/oceanlotus-with-cve-2017-8570/>





# Example - OceanLotus

OceanLotus uses this DLL module in several activities.

360 Threat Intelligence Center @360TIC · 9月12日  
 Possible #OceanLotus #APT group recent targeted attack cases by exploiting #CVE-2017-11882 and #EternalBlue.  
[ti.360.net/blog/articles/...](https://ti.360.net/blog/articles/...)

这段Shellcode再次解密出一个PE并映射到内存中，dump出来后发现是{A96B020F-0000-466F-A96D-A91BBF8EAC96}.dll，这个dll为“海莲花”组织使用，并在360威胁情报中心多份“海莲花”报告中都有提及，其连接域名如下。

- nngmpggmeggidggjjggmhggmpggjhgmgkgmpggnhggmpggjnggmeggmegg.ijmlajip.straliaenollma.xyz
- nngmpggmeggidggjjggmhggmpggjhgmgkgmpggnhggmpggjnggmeggmegg.ijmlajip.ourkekwiciver.com
- nngmpggmeggidggjjggmhggmpggjhgmgkgmpggnhggmpggjnggmeggmegg.ijmlajip.dieordaunt.com

## 海莲花APT团伙利用CVE-2017-8570漏洞的新样本及关联分析

2018-04-17 By 360威胁情报中心 | 事件追踪

{A96B020F-0000-466F-A96D-A91BBF8EAC96}.dll

解密出的DLL的资源中有一个加密的资源文件：

Dump的DLL文件的导出名信息：

```

00639CE8 ; Export Address Table for {A96B020F-0000-466F-A96D-A91BBF8EAC96}.dll
00639CE8 ;
00639CE8 off_639CE8 dd rva DllEntry ; DATA XREF: .rdata:00639CDC to
00639CE8 ;
00639CE8 ; Export Names Table for {A96B020F-0000-466F-A96D-A91BBF8EAC96}.dll
00639CE8 ;
00639CE8 off_639CE8 dd rva aDllentry ; DATA XREF: .rdata:00639CE0 to
00639CE8 ; "DllEntry"
00639CF0 ;
00639CF0 ; Export Ordinals Table for {A96B020F-0000-466F-A96D-A91BBF8EAC96}.dll
00639CF0 ;
00639CF0 word_639CF0 dw 0 ; DATA XREF: .pdata:00639CE4 to
00639CF2 aA96b020f000046 db '{A96B020F-0000-466F-A96D-A91BBF8EAC96}.dll',0
00639CF2 ; DATA XREF: .rdata:00639CCD to
00639D10 aDllentry dd 0 ; DATA XREF: .rdata:00639CE0 to
00639D26 align 400h
00639D26 _rdata ends
00639D26
00639D26
00639D26 - Section 3 (virtual address 00000000)
    
```

{A96B020F-0000-466F-A96D-A91BBF8EAC96}.dll

<https://ti.360.net/blog/articles/oceanlotus-targets-chinese-university/>

<https://ti.360.net/blog/articles/oceanlotus-with-cve-2017-8570/>

# Example - OceanLotus

## Update TTPs

Initial Access

Spear Phishing

Payload Execution

multiple stage script  
PowerShell  
Cobalt Strike

Persistence

Hijack CLSID

Defense Evasion

Bypass Applocker

- Google Update (old)
- Flash Player (new)
- Word (new)

C&C/Exfiltration

- DNS tunnel
- Cobalt Strike beacon with Malleable-C2-Profiles

```

sub_8      proc near          ; CODE XREF: seg000:000002F1p
           pop     edi
           mov     ebp, [edi]
           add     edi, 4
           mov     esi, [edi]
           xor     esi, ebp
           add     edi, 4
           push    edi

loc_16:    mov     eax, [edi]          ; CODE XREF: sub_8+221j
           xor     eax, ebp
           mov     [edi], eax
           xor     ebp, eax
           add     edi, 4
           sub     esi, 4
           xor     eax, eax
           cmp     esi, eax
           js     short loc_2C
           jmp     short loc_16

loc_2C:    pop     ebp          ; CODE XREF: sub_8+201j
           jmp     ebp

sub_6      endp ; sp-analysis failed

           call   sub_8

           dd     98330778h
           dd     9830D778h
           dd     98DB9335h
           db     14
    
```



```

IF ( *RegCreateKeyEx(
  (HKEY)0x00000001,
  "Software\\Classes\\CLSID\\{E0228FDF-9EA8-4870-83b1-96b02CFE0D52}",
  0,
  0x164,
  0x003Fu,
  (PKKEY)NumberOfBytesWritten,
  0x164)
&& *RegCreateKeyEx(
  (HKEY)0x00000001,
  "Software\\Classes\\CLSID\\{E0228FDF-9EA8-4870-83b1-96b02CFE0D52}\\InprocServer32",
  0,
  0x164,
  0x003Fu,
  (PKKEY)NumberOfBytesWritten,
  0x164) )
    
```

```

push     ebp
mov      ebp, esp
push    edi
push    offset LibFileName ; "wu1ib.dll"
call    ds:LoadLibraryW
mov     edi, eax
test    edi, edi
jz      loc_300016DD

           ; CODE XREF: sub_30001573+1781j

push    ebx
push    esi
mov     esi, ds:GetProcAddress
push    offset aFmain ; "FMain"
push    edi ; hModule
call   esi ; GetProcAddress
push    offset aWdcommanddis_0 ; "wdCommandDispatch"
push    edi ; hModule
mov     ebx, eax
call   esi ; GetProcAddress
push    offset aWdgetapplica_0 ; "wdGetApplicationObject"
push    edi ; hModule
mov     dword_30003010, eax
call   esi ; GetProcAddress
    
```



```


http-get {
  set uri "/s/ref=nb_sb_noss_1/167-3294888-0262949/field-keywords=books";

  client {

    header "Accept" "**/*";
    header "Host" "www.amazon.com";
  }
}
    
```

# Methodology - Analysis

MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques & Common Knowledge in the attack lifecycle.





# Example - Analysis

**Actors use their own tacticals and techniques.**  
Comparison of delivery from spear-phishing email.

	OceanLotus	DroppingElephant	Darkhotel	APT-C-01	Group 123	APT28
decoy document	√	√	√	√	√	√
RAR/SFX				√		
phishing link					√	√
link to compromised website					√	√
drive-by download		√				√

# Example - Analysis

Comparison of establishing foothold/ 1<sup>st</sup> implant payload

	OceanLotus	DroppingElephant	Darkhotel	APT-C-01	Group 123	APT28
exploit document	√	√	√	√	√	√
DDE						√
malicious macro	√	√	√			√
HTA				√		
scriptlet	√	√			√	√
PowerShell	√	√			√	√
LNK				√		
PE	√			√		

# Example - Analysis

Major techniques used for the payload.

	OceanLotus	DroppingElephant	Darkhotel	APT-C-01	Group 123	APT28
C/C++	√	√	√	√	√	√
.Net		√	√			
PowerShell	√	√	√	√	√	
Autolt		√				√
Delphi						√
Cobalt Strike	√					
Open Source Code	√	√				√

	OceanLotus	DroppingElephant	Darkhotel	Group 123	APT28
Bypass Applocker	√		√		
DLL Hijack	√		√		
UAC Bypass	√		√		
Image Steganography			√	√	√
PE ReflectiveLoader		√			
job schedule		√			
CLSID hijack	√				



# Example - Analysis

Infrastructures used for C&C or exfiltration

	OceanLotus	DroppingElephant	Darkhotel	APT-C-01	Group 123	APT28
domain registration	√	√	√			√
DDNS				√		
Cloud Storage					√	
DGA						
DNS Tunnel	√					
Compromised website					√	√

# Methodology - Analysis

We construct APT actors TTP & Profiles as objects and relations, it can easily find the relation and overlapping based on the graph database and theory.

- relations of observed data ( Internal graph analysis tool from 360 Netlab )
  - hash, IP, domain
  - PDNS, Whois registration
- relations of actors and its indicators, aim to find the related technique details. ( neo4j demo )
  - actor and its alias name
  - payload used
  - infrastructure used
  - etc.

# Example 1 – actors overlapping & relations

THURSDAY, JULY 12, 2018

## Advanced Mobile Malware Campaign in India uses Malicious MDM

*This blog post is authored by Warren Mercer and Paul Rascagneres and Andrew Williams.*

### SUMMARY

Cisco Talos has identified a highly targeted campaign against 13 iPhones which appears to be focused on India. The attacker deployed an open-source mobile device management (MDM) system to control enrolled devices. At this time, we don't know how the attacker managed to enroll the targeted devices. Enrollment could be done through physical access to the devices, or most likely by using social engineering to entice a user to register. In social engineering attacks the victim is tricked into clicking accept or giving the attacker physical access to a device. This campaign is of note since the malware goes to great lengths to replace specific mobile apps for data interception. Talos has worked closely with Apple on countering this threat. Apple had already actioned 3 certificates associated with this actor when Talos reached out, and quickly moved to action the two others once Talos tied them to the threat.

<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/07/Mobile-Malware-Campaign-uses-Malicious-MDM.html>

## 多个疑似“摩河昔”团伙来源定向攻击的关联分析

2018-07-27 By 360 Threat Intelligence Center @360TIC

正在关注

Correlation analysis of #DroppingElephant, #Confucius and #Bahamut #APT groups based on malware sample and network infrastructure [ti.360.net/blog/articles/](https://ti.360.net/blog/articles/) ...




# Example1 – actors overlapping & relations

internal graph analysis tool from 360 Netlab

## C2 Addresses:

- adhath-learning[.]com
- stepontheroof[.]com
- ns1[.]b3autybab3s[.]com
- stilletowheels[.]com
- b3autybab3s[.]com
- fierybarrels[.]com
- mail[.]cooperednews[.]info
- ns2[.]cooperednews[.]info
- teensechs[.]com**
- newstodayreviews[.]com
- ns2[.]softwares-free[.]com
- www[.]fierybarrels[.]com



<https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-confucius-says-malware-families-get-further-by-abusing-legitimate-websites/>

# Example1 – actors overlapping & relations

https://ti.360.net/search?type=domain&value=ifengnews.com

威胁研判分析 ifengnews.com

ifengnews.com

威胁情报 2

APT-C-09 DROPPING ELEPHANT

HANGOVER PATCHWORK

THE DROPPING ELEPHANT

VICEROY TIGER 摩诃尊 白象

开源情报

情报源

SKYEYELABS

流行度 ☆☆☆☆☆

动态域名

隐私保护

白名单

创建时间 2018/01/19

更新时间 2018/03/24

过期时间 2019/01/19

internal graph analysis tool from 360 Netlab

https://ti.360.net/search?type=domain&value=todaychina.world

威胁研判分析 todaychina.world

todaychina.world

威胁情报 1

HANGOVER PATCHWORK

THE DROPPING ELEPHANT

VICEROY TIGER 白象

开源情报

情报源

SKYEYELABS

流行度 ☆☆☆☆☆

动态域名 否


隐私保护 否

白名单 否

创建时间 2018/01/19

更新时间 2018/03/24

过期时间 2019/01/19



<https://ti.360.net/blog/articles/analysis-of-apt-c-09-target-china/>

# Example1 – actors overlapping & relations


internal graph analysis tool from 360 Netlab

**91.195.240.82**

type	ip
degree	11
link_start	2018-03-08 22:01:01
link_end	2018-09-09 09:44:20
ports_tcp	80
asn	47846 SEDO_GmbH
country	Germany
province	Unknown
city	Unknown

**Links (11)**  
all links are dns\_a

source	target	type
<input type="checkbox"/> teensechs.com	91.195.240.82	dns_a
<input type="checkbox"/> news-letters-4u.com	91.195.240.82	dns_a
<input type="checkbox"/> transeksualov.com	91.195.240.82	dns_a
<input type="checkbox"/> todaychina.world	91.195.240.82	dns_a
<input type="checkbox"/> videoapp.world	91.195.240.82	dns_a
<input type="checkbox"/> neistovo.com	91.195.240.82	dns_a
<input type="checkbox"/> zadnitsa.com	91.195.240.82	dns_a
<input type="checkbox"/> nophoz.com	91.195.240.82	dns_a
<input type="checkbox"/> uchitel-nitsa.com	91.195.240.82	dns_a
<input type="checkbox"/> www.nophoz.com	91.195.240.82	dns_a
<input type="checkbox"/> sechshun8.com	91.195.240.82	dns_a




source	target	type	link_start
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> teensechs.com	91.195.240.82	dns_a	2018-03-08 22:01:01
<input type="checkbox"/> news-letters-4u.com	91.195.240.82	dns_a	2018-03-09 08:51:01
<input type="checkbox"/> transeksualov.com	91.195.240.82	dns_a	2018-03-11 09:21:01
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> todaychina.world	91.195.240.82	dns_a	2018-03-22 16:16:01
<input type="checkbox"/> videoapp.world	91.195.240.82	dns_a	2018-04-02 14:40:01



# Example1 – actors overlapping & relations

The IP address(91.195.240.82) belongs to SEDO GmbH, a Germany domain service provider.


Address type	IPv4
ASN	<a href="#">AS47846</a> SEDO GmbH
Organization	SEDO GmbH
Route	<a href="#">91.195.240.0/23</a>



# Example1 – actors overlapping & relations

	Confucius	Dropping Elephant	Bahamut
Target	South Asia	China, South Asia	South Asia, Middle East
Target platform	PC, Android	PC, Android	Android
Payload	Delphi	Delphi, C#	
Initial Compromised	Social media	Spear Phishing, Social media	Spear Phishing, Social media

# Example2 – actors overlapping & relations





# Summary

Leveraging OSINT give us a more comprehensive insight on APT groups.

We believe that APT groups have limited resources and time. They may reuse some custom tools or infrastructures.

OSINT can help us correlate evidence of the actor and complete the puzzle.

# Summary

Twitter : @360TIC

Blog :

Wechat account



<https://ti.360.net/blog/>



THANKS